This paper offers a new explanation for the results of twin studies in political science that supposedly disclose a genetic basis for political traits. I argue that identical twins tend to be more alike than non-identical twins because the former are more similarly affected by the same environmental conditions, but the content of those greater trait similarities is nevertheless completely malleable and determined by particular environments. The twin studies method thus can neither prove nor refute the argument for a genetic basis of political traits such as liberal and conservative preferences or voting turnout. The meaning of heritability estimates results in twin studies are discussed, as well as the definition and function of the environment in the political science twin studies. The premature attempts to associate political traits with specific genes despite counter trends in genetics are also examined. I conclude by proposing that the alternative explanation of this paper may explain certain puzzles in behavioral genetics, particularly why social and political traits have higher heritability estimates than common physical and medical traits. I map the main point of disagreements with the methodology and the interpretation of its results, and delineate the main operative implications for future research.
Introduction
Recent studies have suggested there is a connection between genetic factors on the one hand, and political preferences and behavior on the other. A small but very influential group of scholars in political science, aided by behavioral geneticists, have termed their work the "new empirical biopolitics" and "genopolitics" (Biuso 2008 ). Compared to earlier biopolitics scholarship 1 , these scholars are now "confident that this recent, decidedly empirical variant of biopolitics will flourish as political scientists become increasingly aware that biology does not equate with either universalism or determinism" (Alford and Hibbing 2008: 185 ; see also Fowler and Schreiber 2008; Hatemi et al. 2009a ).
A major argument concerning genes and politics was first raised in relation to the question "why do people think and act politically the way they do?" Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) suggested that left and right political orientations and ideologies are grounded in genetic predispositions. Fowler, Baker, and Dawes (2008) made a similar argument regarding the question "why do people vote?" and Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves (2009) suggested that genes contribute to the 'gender gap' in political preferences. Hatemi et al. (2009a) found that genes determine the strength of one's party identification but not the party identification itself. The primary criticisms of these studies have focused on the tenability of the equal environment assumption (EEA), namely, that identical and 1 Application of biological theories to politics is not new (Somit 1976; Easton 1976) . For insiders' reflections on the biopolitics subfield and why it has not been well received see Hines (1982) , Losco (1982) , Masters (1990) , Somit and Peterson (1998) , Alford and Hibbing (2004) ; see also Tooby and Cosmides (1992) and Pinker (2003) .
fraternal twins are affected by equal environments (i.e., rather than by more similar environments for identical twins ; Charney 2008a, b; Beckwith and Morris 2008; Joseph 2010; Suhay, Kalmoe, and McDermott 2007) . Beyond this, the political science literature remained silent about this scholarship and especially about its biological arguments.
The main contribution of this paper is to offer an alternative explanation for the results of twin studies in political science. I argue that the genetic factor, namely, the greater genetic similarity in identical twins, can only explain why identical twins are more similar to each other in various traits compared to non-identical twins, but this genetic factor cannot explain the specific political content or direction of these traits. In fact, the twin research design employed in political science does not and cannot actually test the hypothesis that twins and people in general are genetically predisposed to have certain political traits rather than completely opposite ones for the exact same genotype.
This explanation has not yet been considered in interpreting the results of the twin studies in political science, but it may require the rethinking of some of the assumptions, interpretations, and methodologies that are used in this field of inquiry. The analysis offered here can also contribute to current discussions and considerations on how to proceed in funding research on the possible connection between genes and politics in political science (Lupia 2011) . 2 2 It is important to stress that this paper focuses on the classic twin studies models and genetic association studies that have been published in political science. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss other genetic approaches such as adoption studies and extended twin family studies (Hatemi et al. 2010) . Those approaches have their own complications and their results can at times contradict the results of twin studies (e.g., It should be stressed that the alternative explanation of the twin study results I propose in this paper does not posit that there are no biological dispositions which are relevant to social life and politics. Human universals and dispositions have been identified as well as their relevance to social science (e.g., Brown 1991 Brown , 1999 Brown , 2004 Pinker 2003; Shultziner 2010 . My main point is that the method of comparing twins does not and cannot reveal a genetic basis of political preferences.
The assertion that the comparison of traits in twin pairs could disclose a disposition for having certain political traits and not completely different ones is thus based on an a priori and untested assumption about what twin studies actually prove. Accordingly, this paper addresses twin studies as a general method of comparing pair types of twins; it is not a critique against a particular twin study method or experiment. None of the twin study methods in political science has dealt with or tested the alternative explanation that I propose in this paper.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present an alternative biological explanation to the common results of the standard twin research design that show greater correlations of trait similarities in identical twins compared to non-identical twins. In section 3, I discuss the problematic ways in which the concepts of 'heritability estimates', 'environment', and the 'genetic factor' are defined and used in twin studies. In section 4, I shortly address the attempt that has been made to associate specific genes and Feldman and Otto 1997; Keller, Medland, and Duncan 2009) . For similar reasons, I do not inquire into the recent literature on personality and politics that tends to cite and be cited in twin studies (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; compare to Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012; and to Greenstein 1992; and Winter 2003) .
6 chromosome regions with political traits. In section 5, I examine the wider relevance of this analysis to results and puzzles in behavioral genetics. In section 6, I map the operative implications of this paper to future research.
An Alternative Explanation to the Twin Studies
The twin studies method relies on comparisons of traits in monozygotic (MZ, or identical) twins and dizygotic (DZ, or fraternal) twins. Each pair of twins is assumed to be affected by an equal, yet special, environment and life history from the time of inception. It is important to stress that the comparison of twins is not a direct genetic comparison. We know nothing about the specific genetic makeup of the twins. We do know that MZ twins are born from the same fertilized egg that split and produced two embryos, and hence they are taken to be genetically identical. DZ twins are born from two separate eggs that were fertilized by two different sperms and developed in the same womb, and they share an average of fifty percent of their genes (identical by descent), like any other pair of siblings (the proportion of genetic makeup of full siblings was found to range between 0.374 to 0.617 percent; Visscher et al. 2006 ).
The results of greater trait resemblance in MZ compared to DZ twins have produced heritability estimates for various traits (for reviews see Johnson et al. 2009; Turkheimer 2000 Turkheimer , 2004 . Heritability is the proportion of phenotypic variance in the population that can be attributed to genetic differences in that population (see the discussion on heritability in section 3). Political scientists who used twin studies have also presented heritability estimates for left and right wing ideological preferences, and for political behavior such as voting turnout (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves 2009) . In this paper I refer to those political preferences and behavior as 'political traits' for short. Authors of these studies contend that the estimates indicate a genetic effect or cause in the form of genetic structures ("political genotypes") that produce distinct liberal or conservative traits or "political phenotypes" (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2008) . They argue that the genetic effect is not deterministic but probabilistic. Yet this does not change the basic argument that the hypothesized genetic effect is for a certain political preference or behavior. This assertion is crucial to everything that follows from twin research (see Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005: 155) . I argue that there is indeed a biological (or genetic) explanation for the twin study results but it is not the type of genetic effect which is suggested in the literature.
The central question that must be raised in this context is why MZ twin pairs tend to be more similar than DZ pairs in some of their political traits. I set aside non-genetic or environment-only explanations and focus on the biological side of the argument. The most logical explanation of the results of twin studies is that individuals with identical genomes (e.g., MZ twins) react more similarly to the same particular environmental effects compared to individuals with non-identical genomes (e.g., DZ twins) under equivalent conditions, but the genomes do not narrowly determine the traits themselves and equally enable a wide range of possible reactions and phenotypic expressions for the exact same genome. In the context of the twin studies this would mean that MZ twins tend to be more alike on average compared to DZ twins simply because the former are identical (or at least much more genetically alike than DZ twins) and hence they are more similarly affected by the same environmental effects but the content of those greater similarities is nevertheless malleable and predominantly determined by particular environments. When the environment changes, as is often the case, the expression and content (e.g., political preference) of the trait in question could easily change as well. Put differently, changing the environment would not necessarily affect the greater degree of trait similarity in MZ compared to DZ twins (though it could certainly do that as well) but it could have a significant impact on the content of the trait itself. This explanation makes a distinction between the greater trait similarities in MZ twins, which is indeed due to a simple genetic factor, and the separate issue of the trait content which is shaped and altered by the environment. While this explanation is new in the twin studies context, the basic notion underpinning it has been part and parcel of biological theory for decades.
As Richard Lewontin noted early in response to the debate about the heritability of social traits, "A trait can have a heritability of 1.0 in a population at some time, yet could be completely altered in the future by a simple environmental change" (1974: 400).
To illustrate this point in relation to the twin studies let us first take a simple example of two pairs of plant seeds. The one pair is genetically identical, and the other pair is only fifty percent alike. No matter which (equal) environment we plant these two pairs of seeds, the identical pair will tend to appear more similar in the expression of their traits (phenotypes) compared to the non-identical pair for the very simple fact that one pair is identical and the other is not. For instance, the identical seeds will tend to exhibit greater resemblance in terms of their eventual height compared to a greater variation in the height of the non-identical seeds when each pair is influenced by equal environments. But the height itself could vary significantly in different climates or altitudes or due to other such unique conditions. The greater resemblance is indeed solely accounted for by the greater genetic similarity of the identical seeds but the particular phenotype is not. Gilbert 2001 ). This dependency of varied trait expression is due to a wide array of environmental cues, which are often unpredictable, during various stages of development.
"At one temperature, the snapping turtle embryo becomes male; at another temperature it becomes female. Fed one diet, a female ant larva becomes a sterile worker; fed another diet, the same larva becomes an enormous fertile queen" (Ibid: 4). Such phenotypic expression of organisms due to environmental stimuli is also known as 'developmental plasticity' and 'phenotypic plasticity' (Bateson et al. 2004; Gilbert 2001; Sultan 2003; Price, Qvarnstrom, and Irwin 2003) .
The argument that the same genotype can be expressed in very different phenotypes is not a contentious issue in biology; it is more of a bedrock truth that we must consider when interpreting the twin study results. Precisely given this accepted biological premise we must ask: is it not in the genetic repertoire of the twins (and any individual for that matter) to equally and just as easily have an opposite political trait?
After all, and unlike morphological traits, many political traits and preferences are clearly malleable, are not costly to change, and could easily be modified in order to meet changing circumstances (Price, Qvarnstrom, and Irwin 2003 (Gilbert 2001; Gottlieb 2003; Ross 2006; Sultan 2003) . The untested assumption is that, on average, these political preferences will remain the same in different environments due to a genetic effect (Lewontin 1974: 409) .
It should be emphasized that the problem of the underlying causality assumptions of twin studies cannot be resolved by improving statistical methods or by other twin study designs. The heart of the problem is that comparing pairs of twins could not, in any statistical form, support the hypothesis that there are genetic dispositions for having certain political traits and not others. 4 Arguably, this research design also cannot refute 3 On the other hand, stable political preferences, like one's party identification or one's religion, are purely environmental (see also in Hatemi et al. 2009 ).
4 Compare also to the most advanced decomposition and multivariate model that does not the hypothesis because even if in certain environments there were no co-twin differences between MZ and DZ pairs on average, this would not mean that different genotypes could not give rise to similar traits in one set of environments and to completely disparate traits and correlations in others. At this point it should also become obvious that the real null-hypothesis for the twin studies is to test whether twins (and other people) are genetically disposed to having the traits they exhibit and not completely opposite ones for the exact same genotype just as easily.
Yet twin studies involve an implicit assumption that the greater trait resemblance among MZ co-twins compared to DZ co-twins is indicative that certain political traits are hereditary in the population at large. In fact, the only possible way to generalize the twin study results is by interpreting them to mean that the greater resemblance of political traits among MZ twins is due to specific "political genotypes" Hibbing 2005, 2008) or, put less crudely, due to some "genetic effects" (Hatemi et al. 2009a) . If the greater similarity between MZ twins is simply due to a very broad and malleable range of reactions of similar genotypes to random and special environments, no conclusion can be drawn about innate dispositions for any political trait. Only if the traits in the twin studies are interpreted and framed as resulting from "political genotypes" that tend to shape similar political preferences in different environments (or that these genetic effects have a narrow 'norm of reaction ', Lewontin 1974: 404; Gilbert 2001; Sarkar 1999; Sultan 2003) does it make sense to argue that twins' political preferences are tests or solve this cardinal problem (Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012) . See also the discussion in the next section about reared-apart twins as well as the problem of calculating environmental effects into the genetic factor measurement.
genetically affected. And if twins' specific political traits are genetically shaped, so presumably are political traits in the population at large. This, again, is not what the twin studies actually test. Thus the most obvious alternative explanation and null-hypothesis are untested in these studies.
Heritability and Environment in the Twin Studies
Given the basic problems I identified above, this immediately raises the question of what the heritability estimates in twin studies really mean and whether significant estimates are at all indicators of a genetic basis of political traits. Heritability is a much misunderstood and often misapplied concept (Visscher, Hill, and Wray 2008) . In common language (though not in formal definition) it denotes a trait that is passed down from parents to offspring, such as eye or hair color, and is stable and not highly susceptible to the environment. The terms inherited or hereditary are closer to this latter meaning. But in genetics heritability is simply a statistical estimate that is technically defined as "the proportion of phenotypic variance among individuals attributable to genetic differences in that population" (e.g., Alford and Hibbing 2008: 184) . As I will show in this section, this definition of heritability, while useful for some purposes (e.g., plant and livestock breeding), is least appropriate, if relevant at all, to answer the question of whether political genotypes exist. It should be stressed in advance that the limitations pertaining to heritability that I will mention are common knowledge in biology. Some of these limitations are also stated in the twin studies in political science, but not all of them (notably in the seminal paper by Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005) . Therefore many political scientists (and the media) often do not understand or misinterpret the results. But 13 beside these common problems, I will observe far less obvious and more crucial points about the definition of the environment, which may help explain the twin study results.
The first thing to note about heritability is that it refers to variation of a trait across individuals in a certain population (e.g., that of MZ relative to DZ twins). The meaning of this technical definition is that heritability is a statistical estimate that can and does change both between populations, and, more importantly, in the same population under different environmental effects and time periods. 5 Heritability estimates of this sort
give only a snapshot of trait variation between MZ and DZ twins, at a specific point of time and therefore due to particular environmental effects. In Lewontin's words, "the result of the analysis has a historical (i.e., spatiotemporal) limitation and is not in general a statement about functional [or causal] relations" (1974: 403) . Such heritability estimates can be easily modified to the point of statistical insignificance by environmental effects.
5 For example, one study has shown that DZ twins in the age cohort of 18-20 have greater resemblance in their political attitudes relative to MZ twins of the same cohort. After this point, the similarity correlations for MZ twins did not become stronger. Rather, the similarities among DZ co-twins dropped (Hatemi et al. 2009b) . What Hatemi and his colleagues actually show is that heritability estimates can be produced not because MZ become more similar in time (as they argue) but simply due to the fact that DZ twins
show less similarity in a new environment or later in life relative to MZ twins (see also Suhay, Kalmoe, and McDermott 2007; Smith et al. 2012: 24, 28 ; see also discussion in section 5). Based on this technical definition, the scholars argue that their result demonstrates a genetic influence on the transmission of political attitudes in adult life or that heritability increases with age (Ibid: 1152).
Thus, "high heritability [estimate] says little about how difficult it is to change a trait in circumstances other than those in which it was measured" (Mameli and Bateson 2006: 165) . High heritability estimates do not mean that a certain trait will remain similar or stable in a different environment and at a later time, as opposed to what tends to be popularly assumed and even argued from these studies (see Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005: 164-165; and contrast with Hatemi et al. 2009b ).
The second point to note about the technical definition of heritability is that it refers to variation of a trait between populations (inter-individual) at a certain point of time and environment and not to the degree of variation of that same trait within an individual (intra-individual) in all one's developmental periods and in all different environments (Molenaar and Campbell 2009; compare Hatemi et al. 2009b compare Hatemi et al. : 1143 .
Namely, the heritability estimates do not say anything about an individual's level of "trait plasticity" so to speak. Twin study results do not say whether an individual was likely to hold a political preference for only the environment in which it was measured and less or more rigidly in later environments. Indeed, this is precisely why heritability estimates can and often do change in a population sample in a later point of time depending on various factors ranging from age, through the size of the group and methods of measurement, to socio-economic status and ecological conditions (see also Turkheimer et al. 2003; Visscher, Hill, and Wray 2008: 261) . If the environment changes, the heritability measure changes with it (Rose 2006: 526; Lewontin 1974 Alford and Hibbing 2008: 197) . Similarly misleading is to write in the abstract of a paper that "genes appear to play a pivotal role in shaping the strength of an individual's party identification" (Hatemi et al. 2009a : 584 -emphases added).
The thorny issue is how to differentiate between the environmental causes of variation of a trait on the one hand and the genetic factor of that trait on the other. The scholars working in this field in political science acknowledge the importance of genes and the environment, as well as the interaction between the two, in determining political traits. A typical statement is as follows: "The underlying construct that is responsible for a specific trait value (phenotype) is due to some combination of genetic and environmental influences" (Hatemi et al. 2009: 585) . Yet terms such as "some combination" and "interaction" of genes and environment rest on certain crucial assumptions which have also not been properly discussed in the political science literature so far.
The first aspect to note is the definition of 'environment' in the twin models:
"'Environment' is all of the nongenetic external factors that influence trait variation across a population. These influences range broadly from the earliest biological environment of the womb, to the physical environment of a childhood house, to the social environment of the adult workplace" (Alford, Funk and et al. 2012: 18) . This is done in order to isolate the genetic difference between MZ and DZ twins as the genetic factor and thereby to calculate the percentage of the total trait variance that can be associated with this factor in a specific spatiotemporal environment.
The causal importance of the genetic factor is then defined as that percentage, leaving interaction with the environment unspecified and, in fact, non-existent in the model. The 'environment' only explains the variance part that cannot be statistically associated with the genetic variable; it does not interact with the genetic component. The environment is defined in such a way that it cannot explain any part of the variance that is already associated with (or "explained by") the genetic factor. The classic twin studies model is thus based on independent variables, not interacting variables, each with its correlations and separate explanatory power (see also Suhay, Kalmoe, and McDermott 2007) .
This separation will of course result in heritability measures that are higher than what really exists or does not exist. As Visscher, Hill, and Wray explain, "Heritabilities can be manipulated by changing the variance contributed by the environment. This can be as simple as changing the method of measurement " (2008: 261) . One such way to obtain statistically significant heritability measures between MZ and DZ twins is to define the environment in this broad, residual way. This method is very prone to produce falsepositive results of heritability estimates for all sorts of traits which are not hereditary. For example, Schonemann (1997) had shown using the 'National Merit Scholarship twin data', that the question 'did you sell a used textbook during the last year?' resulted in 23% heritability for men and 32% for women. The question 'did you have your back rubbed?' was 92% heritable for men and 21% for women; and 'adult religious preference' was 85% heritable for men and only 21% heritable for women (Schonemann 1997: 104 Second, a greater similarity of reared-apart MZ twins relative to DZ twins still
does not specify what is an environment for having a certain political trait. The studies of twins reared apart from behavioral genetics Bouchard et al. 1990 ), which are mentioned and cited in political science in order to make the case for the validity of reared together twin studies, do not resolve this complex issue because they also do not attempt to define such trait-shaping environments. Third, the results of reared-apart twins showed great difference compared to regular twin studies, and these studies are hard if not impossible to replicate in political science (Medland and Hatemi 2009: 193) . The limited number of studies of twins reared apart and, no less important, the very small sample of twins participating in them (only several dozens MZ and DZ twins) greatly limit their explanatory power and make them highly prone to false positive and other confounding effects because these types of studies require samples in the thousands to have any statistical significance. As pioneers of these studies acknowledge, "Sample sizes were… small, and associated confidence intervals were wide, suggesting the need for caution in interpreting individual correlation coefficients" (Bouchard and On top of the points above there is another cardinal issue and assumption involving the separation of causes of trait variation into genetic and non-genetic causes.
The assumption is that the causes of trait variation can be broken into these independent factors, each contributing or adding separately to the outcome. The assumption that genetic and environmental causes are independent from each other and that their relative causal weight can be measured separately is known as the 'additivity assumption'. And indeed the models employed in the twin studies are additive models in which the effects of genetic and environmental causes are measured separately from each other (e.g., Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005: 158; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008: 234-235) . It is assumed that if the environment is defined and held as a constant factor, the heritability estimate discloses a genetic cause for the trait. Only if the causes are utterly independent could we do so" (Lewontin 1974: 402) . Indeed, it is widely acknowledged in biology that it is impractical to quantify the relative contribution of genes versus the environment in the development of a specific trait because "it is biologically impossible for gene and environment to operate independently of one another" (Meaney 2001: 57) . "Biological systems are complex, non-linear, and nonadditive. Heritability estimates are attempts to impose a simplistic and reified dichotomy (nature/nurture) on nondichotomous processes" (Rose 2006: 527) .
The scholars working in this field are of course aware that genetic and environmental causes are not separate. For example, they note, "Providing statistical estimates of the effects of genetics, shared environment, and unshared environment is not tantamount to asserting that these effects work in isolation from each other" (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2008: 323 Hatemi, Byrne, and McDermott 2012 ).
Yet the way that statistical associations of additive models are presented and over-claimed in political science has given the false impression that the genetic and environmental factors have been analytically separated when in reality they were not.
The limitations of heritability estimates and the additive model are more known outside political science. What is more important is a derivative fatal flaw of this method which is that the genetic estimate itself actually consists of a total and complete conflation of an environmental effect on random genomes for which we know nothing about. This is so because the genetic factor is defined and calculated as the degrees of trait (or phenotypic) differences relative to the ratio of the twins' genetic similarities, but the trait differences themselves are already affected by environmental factors that have not been separated. The genetic factor therefore includes both the genetic proportion between the twin types and various random environmental effects on the expression of their traits. The method concurrently inflates the heritability estimate and creates a false nature-nurture partition. Put simply, environmental effects are calculated as genetic effects. Leading scholars in this field relate to this point and explain that in "a univariate model, additive genetic variance will include all the genetic influence from all covariates, some part of gene-environment covariation if it exists, and some part of gene environment interaction, if it exists" (Hatemi, Dawes, et al. 2011: 74 -emphases added) . They also admit that this model simplifies a far more complex interaction and reality (Ibid). What they apparently fail to see is that this 'covariation' and 'interaction' are not minor possibilities ("if") or mere noise in the measurement of the genetic factor. This covariation, or rather conflation, exists by definition and is built into the model because the genetic factor already includes and measures environmental effects. This point is crucial because it is at the heart of what the defined genetic factor actually measures in the twin studies. At minimum, it produces higher heritability estimates than real by calculating environmental effects as the genetic factor; at worse, it produces false positive results of a genetic effect where it does not actually exists.
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Heritability estimates might therefore convey the wrong notion that the heritability estimate is the amount of causal weight of the genetic factor and that this factor then interacts with the environment in whatever residual percentage of the unexplained variance. As the observation above suggests, the genetic factor is already an expression and confusion of the genetic and environmental factors. Furthermore, it is well known that a heritability estimate of 0.8 does not mean that the trait is eighty percent genetic and twenty percent environmental (Charney 2008: 300; Gottlieb 2003: 338 ; see also Hatemi, Byrne, and McDermott 2012) . It merely suggests that a genetic effect may exist but it says nothing about the relative importance of the genetic factor and the nature of its interaction with the environment in causing the actual trait: to what degree the genetic-factor estimate of X percent for a given political trait is important, a negligible 1% or a crucial 99%; how exactly the genetic factor interacts with the environment; and 6 Although they stress the importance of gene and environment interaction, scholars working in this field are aware that the twin study model does not actually capture this interaction on the one hand, and does not account for the possibility of such interaction and conflation in the definition and calculation of the genetic factor on the other. They admit that more advanced multivariate models are needed for this purpose and that these studies are forthcoming (Smith et al. 2012; Hatemi et al. 2011: 72) . As I noted above, however, the problem and limitation of deriving conclusions on genetic effects from the method of comparing MZ and DZ twins applies to all twin study models.
how the environment affects it. This limitation is well known but the twin study scholars in political science do not resolve these issues of relative weight and types of interaction, other than reiterating that the topic is indeed complex and requires further research.
Instead, they argue that if statistical associations in the additive model disclose any role of possible genetic involvement, "then genes are also likely to play a role in more complex specifications" (Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008: 235 
Genes for Specific Political Traits?
A number of studies have taken further steps since 2008 to identify physiological mechanisms and specific genes that may determine political traits. Oxley et al. (2008) argue that political attitudes are affected by a genetic tendency to fear; maintain that they have identified two genes that code for voting turnout, and one gene that affects partisanship (Dawes and Fowler 2009); and Settle et al. (2010) report that a certain dopamine gene variant (DRD4-7R) seems to make a person more liberal in early adulthood if the person who carries the variant had more than six friends in adolescence. The political science scholarship has remained rather silent about such studies until now while none of them has been replicated or validated. Oxley et al. (2008) argue that sensitivity to threat, and conservative and liberal political attitudes involve neural activity patterns around the amygdala. Because genes affect the amygdala they contend that political attitudes are also affected by genetic factors that affect fear. Yet, the distinction between those who hold different political attitudes is not whether they are more or less inclined to fear, or have greater concern for the social order "but rather, that they perceive different things as constituting threats to that order" (Charney 2009: 5) . The question is to what extent a person's cognition triggers, or is triggered by, certain physical processes. Genes only code for and regulate protein production, they do not directly shape political preferences. Genes that regulate the production of testosterone, for example, may lead one to be aggressive toward conservatives or democrats, religious or secular people, men or women, one ethnic group or another, depending on one's social identity complexity and the perceived out-group in a specific context (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Tajfel and Turner 1979) . The environment and cognition are major causes both in activating genes and in channeling physical processes to various and possibly opposite political ends, for the exact same genotype.
Furthermore, physiologic manifestations of cognitive correlates, like electrical and chemical activity in the brain, sweaty hands or eye blinks, do not constitute proof that a specific political trait is genetic. These physiological processes are enabled and constrained by the human genome in a broad sense, as all human traits are, but this obviously does not mean that any social or political attribute is genetically affected or heritable. The fact that the amygdala is associated with fear does not mean that it, and the genes that affect it, constitute the source of political attitudes in the brain. It has been well-established that any given brain structure, including the amygdala, may have a role in various types of behaviors; and even apparent basic types of behavior and cognition depend on interactions between different brain structures. "Just as there is no single language "organ" in the brain, neither will there be a single political organ in the brain" (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003: 695-696) .
The argument for versions of genes that affect political behavior such as voting turnout and partisanship (Dawes and Fowler 2009 ) is based on the association of a version of a gene (allele) and a certain political trait, a method known as 'genetic association.' The logic behind this method is that a statistical correlation between gene variants and traits may disclose some sort of relationship between the two, although genetic association does not in itself entail a causal pathway from any gene to shaping the political trait (see also, Fowler and Dawes 2008: 580; Settle et al. 2010 Settle et al. : 1195 . Given the current understanding in genetics, and in light of the evidence brought forward so far in political science, the results of these studies are highly suspect of being cases of false positives and must be evaluated with great caution, as will be explained.
It has been widely accepted in the last decade that the crucial majority of traits are affected by multiple-genes (i.e., polygenic traits), as opposed to monogenic traits whereby a single gene affects a single trait, which is quite rare in the population (e.g., (Tay-Sachs, Cystic fibrosis). Basic traits, such as skin color, height, body weight, and disorders such as autism, diabetes, cancer, and psychiatric disorders are known to involve many genes and genomic regions in complicated constellations, and such phenotypes are also susceptible to environmental effects (Kendler 2005) . Furthermore, "[s]ince the proteins produced by genes generally appear to have multiple effects, most of which we have barely begun to understand, it seems unlikely that we can be confident about all of the consequences of any particular genotype in the foreseeable future" (Benjamin 2011: 68) . The surprisingly low degree of genetic factors that have so far been associated with common traits and diseases continues to puzzle geneticists (Maher 2008 (Maher , 2010 Manolio et al. 2009 ). Social behavior is even further complicated with a mix of various interactions and causes. Fowler and Dawes (2008: 581) also acknowledge that behavioral traits in politics are not coded in the genome and are shaped by a multitude of forces.
Thus in the context of existing theoretical and empirical research on common traits and social traits, arguments that one gene affects partisanship, two genes affect highly cognitive and environmentally sensitive political behavior such as voting turnout, and a variant of dopamine gene shapes liberal ideology are very unusual, notwithstanding the supposed controls and moderating affects of limited environmental factors. Even if genes did affect political traits we would expect to find far more complicated relationships. More important, beyond the fact that the studies have not been replicated or validated, some of these candidate genes have received rigorous review and evaluation.
For example, the impact of both of the candidate genes (5-HTT and MAOA) that Fowler and Dawes chose to associate with political behavior, in light of earlier studies that associated them with social behavior, have been reevaluated. With regard to 5-HTT, a meta-review study revealed that research results so far "are still compatible with chance findings" and that even in depression, previously assumed to be directly affected by 5-HTT, the effect "is very small or negligible" and "the possibility that the polymorphism has no association with the disorder at all has not been excluded" (Munafo et al. 2009: 216) . Other research similarly concluded that the "widespread acceptance of these findings is likely to have been in part attributable to the acclaim the original article [Caspi et al. 2003 ] received, as well as a field that was eager for a new approach due to the frustrating lack of progress in gene identification for mental disorders despite intensive efforts for more than a decade" (Risch et al. 2009 (Risch et al. : 2469 . Investigation of the association of the MAOA gene and anti-social behavior has shown mixed and conflicting results (Prichard et al., 2008; Weder et al. 2009; compare to Caspi et al. 2002 and Fergusson et al. 2011 ; and see also MAOA and depression, Huang et al. 2009 ).
It appears that Fowler's and Dawes' results about the assumed connection between candidate genes and political traits are additional cases of random variations or false-positive associations, especially in light of the fact that their choice of these genes was due to those earlier studies that now lack validation (see also Hatemi et al., 2011: 272) . Similar non-reproducible 'false positives' and chance findings have been reported for dozens of traits and disorders, many of which are far more basic (e.g., physiologic) or common than political traits (Joseph 2010; Risch et al. 2009 ). In light of the inability so far to find and isolate the causal and predictive role of genes in physiologic traits, "the challenge is likely to be at least as large for behavioral [political] traits where the causal mechanisms are arguably more complex" (Benjamin 2011: 69) . The neurological evidence about multiple roles of brain structures and various interacting neurological networks in the brain (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003) , which are clearly affected by many genes, also suggest why it is unlikely that political traits are associated with specific genes in any meaningful analytic way. Furthermore, they found several problems in the design of the study including the specification of the phenotype (i.e., political traits); population stratification of ethnic groups; the classification of the genotype and the choice of alleles; and the lack of independence of the cases and their controls whereby, among other things, a larger proportion of MZ and DZ twins (than that which exists in the general population) was included in the sample and therefore confounded the results.
It is quite uncommon at the present stage of scholarship in genetics to argue for a connection between single genes and social traits, even when supposedly controlling for moderating environmental factors. Behavioral genetics has moved away from seeking such a simple connection between genes and traits (Rose 2006; Todd 2006) . Several behavioral geneticists publishing in political science have also admitted that such studies have not proven useful in terms of explanatory power and replication and that "there may be no gene for a specific issue preference or ideological orientation" (Smith et al. 2012: 18). Instead they have recently offered a genome-wide approach that seeks to identify regions on the genome which could be associated with political traits (Hatemi, Gillespie, et al. 2011) . Given the very early stage of this research, the fact that it has not been replicated and its silence about interactions with the environment, it too lacks explanatory power about political traits and behavior (see also Charney and English 2012: 11) .
Furthermore, in this latter type of research "it is not generally recognized that QTL [genome-wide] analysis itself relies on a prior assumption of significant heritability" (Rose 2006: 526) . For example, Hatemi, Gillespie, et al. (2011) The mapping of the genome in this way also does not say how easy it is to change the political traits in question relative to the many chromosomal regions that are identified, nor does it show any interaction or moderation effects of the environment on these traits and on gene expression, effects that are known to be highly important.
Wider Implications
Interestingly, reports of heritability measures in twin studies are often higher for personal characteristics and political preferences than for medical disorders and other physiological traits. (Plomin, Owen and Mcuffin 1994: 1734-35; McGuffin, Riley, and Plomin 2001: 1232; McGue and Lykken 1992; Lykken and Tellegen 1996) .
Political preferences and traits show similar oddities. Martin et al. (1986) estimates (Plomin, Owen, and McGuffin 1994) . Clearly something is wrong about these higher heritability results for political preferences over common medical conditions. If the genes supposedly involved in the expression of political (polygenic) traits are indeed not independent of the environment, as twin study scholars admit (e.g., Fowler and Dawes 2008: 581) , heritability estimates for political traits must therefore be higher rather than significantly lower compared to the expression of biological conditions.
In fact, the heritability estimates of traits in twin studies are greatly at odds with actual studies of the genome that reveal very modest to tiny effects of genes on those same traits. Whereas twin studies found heritability estimates of more than ninety percent for autism and more than eighty percent for schizophrenia, the identification of various gene variants and their associations with those traits did not yield anything close to these results, a gap which is also known as the "missing heritability" puzzle (Maher 2008 (Maher , 2010 Manolio 2010; Manolio et al. 2009 ). Accordingly, doubts have been raised about the actual accuracy and utility of twin studies' heritability estimates (Maher 2008: 21) .
The contrasts between the heritability estimates of common medical conditions and political positions strongly suggest that the latter are either inflated or simply false positives. The alternative explanation that I have offered to the results of the twin studies in political science, thus, may have broader implications to explaining these puzzles.
First, it could now be seen why comparison of twins exaggerates estimates for certain conditions. For example, a certain medical condition could appear in a MZ pair because they have a unique genotype which is responsible for it. Alternatively, the medical condition could appear in the MZ pair because they were adversely affected by the mother's condition during pregnancy or due to other environmental effects after pregnancy, despite not having that genotype (i.e., a non-genetic congenital condition).
The comparison of twins cannot distinguish between the causes and it will inflate the heritability estimate by confounding and conflating the environment effect as a genetic impact because MZ twins will show greater resemblance than DZ twins regardless of whether the source of the condition is genetic or due to random (non-genetic) birth problems. This may explain the gap that was noted above between the high heritability estimates of twin studies and actual genetic research.
Second, twin studies can produce heritability estimates that are lower than they actually are in common traits. I will illustrate this through an examination of the Falconer's formula of heritability (Falconer and MacKay 1996) , which is to subtract the trait correlation of DZ from that of MZ pairs and multiply by two the resulting difference Third, and most relevant to the social sciences, the alternative explanation I proposed in this paper also suggests why certain social and political traits can have higher heritability estimates than certain common traits and conditions in twin studies. This is due to the simple fact that DZ twins react more differently to the same environmental effects compared to MZ twins. In reality, the twins can equally express opposite political preferences under different environments. Yet when we compare MZ and DZ twins under equal environmental impacts, this would result in emphasizing and accentuating their relative trait differences. This explanation is consistent with, and strengthened by, the findings that equal environments often make DZ twins growing up in the same family different rather than more similar to each other; and when MZ twins growing up in the same family also show difference in their traits the reason is normally nonshared 7 Whereas there are twin studies in political science that employ different and more sophisticated methods than the Falconer formula Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008) , this analysis equally applies to them because they are based on the same general method of comparing traits of MZ and DZ twins (see Smith et al. 2012) .
environmental factors (Plomin 1989; Plomin, Owen and Mcuffin 1994: 1735-36) .
Scholars who are using twin studies in political science explicitly admit this in a paper just published, where they note that MZ twins "share precisely the same susceptibility to environmental influence" while the reaction DZ twins to similar environments "produce[s] variations in the phenotype" (Smith et al. 2012: 28 -original emphasis) .
What they fail to conclude, however, is that the crucial issue is not the "susceptibility" of any gene or genotype, but simply the obvious point that MZ will always tend to respond more alike to similar environments, no matter what they are, compared to a similar experiment with DZ twins. This explains both why political traits have such inflated (and hence false) heritability estimates and why these estimates are unreasonably higher than those of certain common physiological traits and conditions. While many aspects of human behavior are certainly affected and shaped by genetic factors, the question remains whether twin studies actually reveal a hereditary basis of political traits. If the proposed explanation of this paper is correct, it will require rethinking the broader meaning of the twin study results not in political science alone.
Conclusion and Operative Implications for Future Research
It is likely that the scholars who are working with twin studies will not agree with my alternative explanation to twin study results and that they may want to address this paper in some way. In this section I summarize the key arguments and note where they disagree with the published literature. The purpose of this section is also to focus the debate on the central issues and reduce the risk of sidetracking it into minor points. I also specify what are the operative implications for future research, at least in my view.
First, the most important argument of this paper is that there is indeed a biological explanation to the twin study results but it is not the explanation that has been proposed in the literature so far. I argued that MZ twins are often more alike than DZ twins because similar genomes tend to react more similarly to similar effects, no matter what these effects are and what the traits are. I made a distinction between the explanation of trait similarity (which is due to a simple genetic factor) and the completely different issue of explaining trait content (e.g., a political preference) which is shaped only by the environment. Given that it is a bedrock truth in biology (accepted also by those working in political science) that the exact same genotype can give rise to diverse and even opposite traits, the twin studies do not and cannot test the hypothesis that they set to prove, namely, that there is a genetic effect on political attitudes. What these studies show is that trait similarity is indeed accounted for because identical genomes tend to react similarly to a similar environment. However, scholars have been wrongly interpreting this obvious result as an indication of a genetic effect on shaping the content of political traits. The operative implication for future research is to show that in twin studies the environment is not actually the sole determinant of the trait content. Future studies need to find a way to separate the explanation of trait similarity from that of trait content and refute this null-hypothesis. As I explain above, this will not be an easy challenge but it has implications beyond political science in reference to the missing heritability puzzle that was noted above.
Second, I argued that the measurements in twin studies both exaggerate the genetic effect and confound between the genetic and environmental effects. The definition of the environment in the classic twin studies leaves everything but the ratio of genetic similarity between MZ and DZ twins as a constant factor (Smith et al. 2012: 18) .
This research design cannot test substantial interactions with environmental factors in the degree of complexity that is known to exist in political science. The 'environment' component only accounts for the variance part that cannot be statistically associated with the genetic variable. Furthermore, a major problem is that the genetic estimate itself actually consists of a total and complete conflation of an environmental effect on random genomes for which we know nothing about. This is so because the genetic factor in twin studies is in fact the degrees of trait differences relative to a ratio of genetic similarities, but the trait differences themselves are already affected by environmental factors that have not been separated. This creates a false nature-nurture partition. The combination of the two problems yields inflated heritability estimates and false positive results. In order to demonstrate a genetic effect on political traits, future studies must find a way to define both the genetic factor and the environment in a more sophisticated manner and to disentangle the two separate effects. Twin studies do not appear to be the right tool for this purpose, in any statistical form, as I explained in section 2.
Third, I indicated that in twin studies the heritability measurements for political preferences (many higher than 0.4) are often more than twice than those of many medical disorders and other physiological traits (many lower than 0.2). Political traits are clearly affected by multiple genes (polygenic traits). There is a wide consensus about this fact, including by scholars working to integrate biology and political science. There is clearly something suspect about the fact that heritability measures for political traits are greater than the expression of biological conditions. The analysis of the confluence of the genetic and environmental factors in twin studies may explain why comparison of twins 37 exaggerates estimates for certain conditions where the source may be either genetic or environmental. I suggested (using Falconer's formulae) that twin studies are prone to produce heritability estimates that are lower than they actually are in common traits where the differences between twins are not substantial yet have a genetic source.
Finally, the alternative explanation of this paper explains why the twin study model is prone to yield high heritability estimates and false positive results for many political preferences that most likely do not have a genetic basis. The implication of this goes beyond political science. Solving these puzzles may also help solve the missing heritability mystery of many basic physiologic traits in biology.
